Sir,
New York, August 27th:
1790.
Being very desireous of obtaining such aids and information as will
enable me to form a just opinion upon the subject of the enclosed paper, in case the
events therein mentioned should take place; I have taken the liberty to submit it to you
for your consideration, requesting that you will favor me with an opinion thereon.1
With very great esteem & regard / I am / Sir, / Your most
Obedt: Hbe. Servt.
Go: Washington
(Secret)
United States August 27th:
1790
Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain should come to
the decision of Arms, from a variety of circumstances (individually unimportant and
inconclusive, but very much the reverse when compared and combined) there is no doubt in
my mind, that New Orleans and the Spanish Posts above it on the Mississippi will be
among the first attempts of the former, and that the reduction of them will be
undertaken by a combined operation from Detroit.2
The Consequences of having so
formidable and enterprising a people as the British on both our flanks and rear, with
their navy in front, as they respect our Western settlements which may be seduced
thereby, as they regard the Security of the Union and its commerce with the West Indies,
are too obvious to need enumeration.
What then should be the answer of the Executive of the United
States to Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march Troops
through the Territory of the said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?3
What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it should be
undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?
Mr. Adams will oblige the President of
the United States by giving his opinion in writing on the above statement.
Go: Washington
RC and enclosure (Adams Papers); internal address: “Mr. Adams—” and “Mr. Adams.”;
docketed by JA: “No. 1.” and “No. 2.”
410
1.
With minor alterations in wording, Washington sent the same query
to his entire cabinet. Most of them replied immediately, anxious to resolve the first
test of American neutrality. JA, John Jay, and Henry Knox all cited law
of nations theory—especially the works of jurists Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius,
and Samuel von Pufendorf—and strongly advised sitting out the Nootka Sound conflict
until either Great Britain or Spain formally approached with a request to move troops
through American territory. Thomas Jefferson outlined a more aggressive path of
preemptive denial, to be underlined by force if necessary. Alexander Hamilton,
replying a month later, upheld the majority view. Just as JA observed in
his reply of 29 Aug., below,
Hamilton emphasized that the United States lacked the military, the money, and the
popular support needed to go to war. He wrote: “There are causes which render war in
this country more expensive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on than in
any other. There is a general disinclination to it in all classes” (Washington, Papers, Presidential Series
, 6:353–361, 439–460). See also Descriptive List of Illustrations,
No. 6, above.
2.
Spain held regional posts in St. Louis and Natchez, Mississippi
(Abernethy, The South in the New Nation
, p. 208).
3.
False rumors that Benedict Arnold was reviewing the Detroit,
Mich., militia fueled concern that the British planned to invade Spanish Louisiana.
Arnold, however, was mired in a series of lawsuits in St. John, New Brunswick, Canada,
during 1790 (vol. 19:48; Washington, Papers, Presidential Series
, 6:344–345).